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Agents, Coercive Learning, and Social 
Protection Policy Diffusion in Africa 
Stephen Devereux and Anna Wolkenhauer 
December 2021 
Summary 
This paper makes theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions to the 
study of social policy diffusion, drawing on the case of social protection in Africa, 
and Zambia in particular. We examine a range of tactics deployed by 
transnational agencies (TAs) to encourage the adoption of cash transfers by 
African governments, at the intersection between learning and coercion, which 
we term ‘coercive learning’, to draw attention to the important role played by TA-
commissioned policy drafting, evidence generation, advocacy, and capacity-
building activities. Next, we argue for making individual agents central in the 
analysis of policy diffusion, because of their ability to reflect, learn, and interpret 
policy ideas. We substantiate this claim theoretically by drawing on practice 
theories, and empirically by telling the story of social protection policy diffusion in 
Zambia through three individual agents. This is complemented by two instances 
of self-reflexivity in which the authors draw on their personal engagements in the 
policy process in Zambia, to refine our conclusions about the interplay of 
structure and agency. 
Keywords 
Agents, cash transfers, coercive learning, policy diffusion, self-reflexivity, social 
protection, transnational agencies, Zambia. 
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The adoption by numerous African governments of a similar set of social 
protection policies and programmes is often analysed as a paradigmatic case of 
policy diffusion or policy transfer. A particular social protection discourse has 
been actively and successfully promoted since the late 1990s by many 
international development agencies – bilateral and multilateral donors, United 
Nations organisations, international financial institutions, and international non-
governmental organisations. 
This paper contributes to this literature. We first introduce the concept of 
‘coercive learning’ to focus on a specific set of mechanisms that have been 
deployed by international development agencies in support of the diffusion of 
social protection policies throughout Africa. This concept draws on two of the 
four commonly agreed transmission mechanisms: learning and coercion. We 
argue that learning is not a neutral process but is political and shaped by 
ideology. This is especially significant in the context of learning that is explicitly 
linked to policy advocacy, where hegemonic ideas are promoted through soft 
forms of coercion such as donor resource flows. 
‘Coercive learning’ therefore describes the propagation of certain ideas through 
mechanisms such as: selecting the conceptual frameworks that underpin 
national social protection policies (ranging from narrowly neoliberal targeted to 
more progressive and inclusive approaches); selective investment in evidence-
building (notably empirical impact evaluations of social protection projects) with 
the intention of influencing policy adoption or policy reform; research into 
financing options that aims to challenge perceptions by African policymakers that 
social protection is unaffordable and that no fiscal space exists in low-income 
countries; and finally, delivering professional training or capacity-building inputs 
to government officials that reflect the ideas and ideological positions of the 
agencies that design and deliver this training. 
Our second contribution to this literature is to draw a distinction between 
agencies and agents. We note, based on a pragmatist theoretical framework, 
that individuals (agents) are the carriers of ideas that are promoted and financed 
by institutions (agencies) because only human beings can ultimately make 
knowledge effective. Since agents of international development agencies 
(whether policy advisors or consultants) bring not only their technical expertise 
but also their own positionality and inherent biases when interacting with African 
governments, the diffusion of social policy is thus not a predictable and linear 
process by which the intentions of agencies are simply and mechanistically 
carried out. Instead, policy diffusion is always also marked by personal 
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relationships and the specific experiences and perspectives of all the agents 
involved. 
To illuminate the centrality of agents, we identify three individuals who played 
major roles in the introduction and institutionalisation of social cash transfers in 
Zambia and examine how they exercised policy influence through their personal 
connections, both to the international community and to domestic politicians and 
civil servants. 
Finally, this paper also makes a contribution to this literature at the 
methodological level. Given the central role of individual agents in the social 
protection policy process in African countries, we argue for agents to adopt a 
critical self-reflexive lens, partly to deepen our understanding of the contingent 
nature of the policy diffusion process, and partly for agents to acknowledge that 
inserting themselves into policy processes is in itself an expression of power that 
derives not from domestic authority or legitimacy but from transnational sources 
of epistemic authority, underpinned by the soft power of international 
development finance. To illustrate how such a self-reflexive reflection might be 
undertaken, the authors revisit and interrogate our own roles as agents engaged, 
albeit in a more limited way, with the social protection discourse and practice in 
Zambia.
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The spread of social protection policies across Africa can be considered as a 
paradigmatic case of policy diffusion. In the late 1990s, a group of influential 
transnational actors1 (TAs) began advocating for a particular social protection 
instrument, social cash transfers (SCTs), as ‘a new instrument for combating 
poverty’ in Africa (Leisering 2019). Two indicators capture social protection’s 
rapid rise up the social policy agenda in the new millennium. Firstly, social 
protection appeared in none of the eight Millennium Development Goals in 2000, 
but in three of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals in 2015 (UN 2015). 
Secondly, no African country had a National Social Protection Policy or Strategy 
in 2000, but 35 of 55 countries had published theirs by 2020 (Devereux 2020). 
As we will see, these policy documents were strongly influenced by the 
involvement of TAs. In this paper, we map this diffusion process in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and analyse the case of Zambia to make three arguments. 
First, based on our reading of diffusion theories and an analysis of social 
protection in Zambia, we suggest the term ‘coercive learning’, to draw attention 
to the interwovenness of hegemonic ideas, the collective construction of social 
policy ideals, and concrete processes of cross-country and within-country 
learning. Constructivist scholars have long established that the power of 
international agencies in large part rests on their ability to define problems and 
delineate the realm of imaginable solutions (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Since 
the ‘socialisation of global politics’ from the 1980s onwards (Deacon, Hulse and 
Stubbs 1997), learning about social protection programmes – their design, 
effectiveness, etc. – has been part and parcel of the diffusion process in Africa 
(Davis et al. 2016). However, while policy diffusion is often presented as a 
technical undertaking, based on accumulated learning about objectively proven 
best practices, it is inherently political (Gilardi and Wasserfallen 2019). Learning 
is political because the way we ‘know’ the world has repercussions for how we 
act towards it, and this has material effects. The creation and propagation of a 
dominant social protection discourse, underpinned by, and enabling, resource 
flows and political pressures, can thus be considered a soft form of coercion. 
Secondly, while pointing to the coercive dimension of policy learning, we make 
an argument for taking the role of individual agents seriously: agents’ agency 
matters. Especially when studying processes of ‘knowing’, it is individual human 
beings who acquire, transmit, translate, and diffuse knowledge. Kuhlmann et al. 
 
1 We use the term ‘transnational actors’ (TAs) to refer to both ‘transnational agencies’ (including bilateral 
donors, multilateral agencies, United Nations organisations, international financial institutions, and 
international non-governmental organisations) and ‘transnational agents’ (individuals employed or 
contracted by transnational agencies). TAs are also called in the literature ‘international development 
agencies’, ‘development partners’, and ‘technical and financial partners’ (TFPs). 
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(2020: 87), too, have argued that ‘money, people and procedures’ are key 
carriers of diffusion, and that people in particular ‘play a crucial role for the 
diffusion of ideas, especially when it comes to the role of knowledge’. We draw 
on practice theory to think this through further. In the theoretical part of this 
paper, we conceptualise the significance of individuals in terms of their structural 
embeddedness on the one hand, and creativity on the other. We argue that this 
view is well suited to account for the structures of the coercive learning context 
that individuals tap into and reproduce, as well as the possibility for change that 
lies in those individuals’ agency. We demonstrate the interplay of structure and 
agency through zooming in on several individual diffusion agents in the Zambian 
context, including through two short cases studies of ourselves. 
Our third contribution is thus a methodological one. Given that the lines between 
policy and academic learning are often impossible to draw and that we as global 
social policy scholars are in various ways ourselves involved in creating the 
social protection discourse, we cannot exclude ourselves from a study of the field 
and should be fully aware of our role as ‘makers and shapers’ (Cornwall and 
Gaventa 2001) of policies in foreign countries. While a means of practicing 
heightened self-awareness, the self-reflexive lens can add to our understanding 
of the ways in which diffusion is contingent rather than a neutral process. By 
extending the study of individual agents to ourselves, we are able to shed more 
light on how agents inevitably reproduce the structural context in which they 
operate but also how their agency creates room for change. The power 
structures we tap into, our positionalities and relationships within the field, and 
not least our own normative motivation make the diffusion of policy knowledge a 
highly contingent process. Adopting a self-reflexive lens can shed light not only 
on these influences on our own role in the transnational diffusion process but can 
be a way of ‘reflecting about an entire community of which we are a part’ (Berten 
and Wolkenhauer 2021: 5). 
In the following, we begin with a theoretical argument for conceiving of diffusion 
as coercive learning, while attributing central importance to individual human 
agents (Section 2). We then concentrate first on the coercive learning that has 
taken place in social protection policy diffusion in Africa, break this down into four 
processes, and argue that agents have mattered (Section 3). In the subsequent 
section, we focus on three individuals who have occupied different positionalities 
in the social protection diffusion process in Zambia, spanning transnational and 
national realms. Building on that, we refine our insights about agents through two 
short pieces of self-reflection, by drawing on our own experiences with coercive 
policy learning in Zambia (Section 4). Finally, Section 5 summarises our main 
contributions and draws out lessons for future diffusion research. 
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2. Agents and coercive learning: a 
structure-agency perspective on 
policy diffusion 
Policy diffusion involves the movement of policy ideas, models, and instruments 
from one context to another (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 2007; Obinger, 
Schmitt and Starke 2013; Kuhlmann et al. 2020).2 The concept is commonly 
agreed to comprise four transmission mechanisms: competition (states vying for 
global advantages keep track of other countries’ policies); emulation (states 
follow international standards); learning (states adapt their policies based on 
ideas and experiences from elsewhere); and coercion (states are pressurised 
into adopting policies they did not freely choose). The latter two especially are of 
interest here and merit a few remarks. First, coercion can be seen to include 
‘softer’ variants, including policy conditionalities, changes in incentives, or the 
imposition of hegemonic ideas (Dobbin et al. 2007). Hegemonic ideas are not 
clearly distinguishable from emulation, which Dobbin et al. (ibid.: 452) include in 
‘constructivism’ as the creation of overriding discourses by epistemic 
communities, to which states then conform (see also Gilardi and Wasserfallen 
2019). This, in turn, exhibits some proximity to learning, as learning is not a 
neutral process, but is shaped by one’s ideological lens at a given point in time. 
For instance, the social protection interventions that were ‘merchandised’ in 
Africa by external agents have been criticised for having been based on a 
narrow, neoliberal understanding of social policy (Adesina 2020). The spread of 
social policies, moreover, needs to be contextualised in what could be 
considered a coercive situation writ large: the push by TAs for poverty reduction 
interventions that followed a period of a seemingly contradictory push (also 
heavily externally induced) for state withdrawal and a shrinking of the public 
sector. The impact evaluations that constituted a major part of the diffusion 
process were meant to establish the cost-effectiveness of specific programme 
designs, trying to reconcile the need to save money with the need for poverty 
reduction. The resulting targeting of transfers to the poorest groups has since 
been criticised for falling short of inclusive social policy ideals (Mkandawire 
2005). The promotion of specific social policy ideas can thus be seen as 
 
2  The literature sometimes distinguishes between policy diffusion and policy transfer. The former is said to 
denote an unintentional process of increasing resemblance of policies across countries with a focus on 
structures, while the latter is said to involve concerted strategies for transferring policy knowledge and 
agency (Obinger et al. 2013: 113). The former is closely associated with International Relations and the 
latter with Public Policy literature; while tending to be based on quantitative versus qualitative analyses, 
respectively. Ultimately, the lines are not clear-cut. By choosing the term “diffusion” as more commonly 
used in the literature of relevance to our cases, we include also the more conscious and agency-related 
dynamics sometimes associated with policy transfer. 
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infringing on governments’ sovereignty and upholding their dependence on 
changing trends in international development aid. Overall, we thus argue that 
learning and coercion are intricately interwoven in the case of social protection 
policy diffusion in Africa. 
The discursive power that TAs possess, due to their role in knowledge creation 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004), comes into being through being enacted by 
individuals. Some authors have therefore suggested focusing on practices rather 
than on discourses as such. Practices are defined as ‘socially meaningful 
patterns of action which… simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify 
background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world’ (Adler and 
Pouliot 2011: 6). Bourdieu’s notion of habitus captures that individuals internalise 
and act on the meanings acquired from the professional communities they 
represent, and that individuals thereby connect structure and agency (Bourdieu 
1977). In other words, discursive structures only come into effect through being 
enacted by individual human beings, as only they are ‘provided with corporeality, 
reflexivity, and the aptitude for abduction’ (Franke and Roos 2010: 1069). 
‘Abduction’ describes the process by which the world becomes known in an 
iterative process that reconciles past knowledge with new impressions. This 
means that agency always has a reproductive component whereby existing 
structures are re-enacted, as well as a component of change, as new situations 
require creative solutions for adapting those structures. To elaborate how this 
works, the individual must be prised open, which can be done by drawing on 
George Herbert Mead’s distinction between an individual’s ‘I’ and ‘me’. 
A basic assumption in Mead’s pragmatist theory is that even individual 
consciousness is socially constituted as it arises from perceiving ourselves 
through the eyes of others. From young age, a child becomes conscious of her 
or his body and its actions through the ways in which others respond to it. 
Awareness of the self is derived from the social surrounding as the child takes 
over the responses of others and develops an attitude towards her- or himself 
(Mead 1962 [1934]). This is what Mead calls the ‘me’, the internalised view of 
society on the self, while ‘I’ is the pre-social component of the self that carries out 
actions in an initially unconscious way and is the place of creativity and 
spontaneity (Franke and Roos 2010: 1069). Rather than rationally determining all 
actions from the outset, the ‘me’ retrospectively makes sense of these actions 
(ibid.). Especially in new situations, when routines no longer work or do not yet 
exist and individuals have to use their creative power of abduction, room opens 
up for developing new rules for action by applying, adapting, and refining existing 
knowledge. 
Following on this conceptualisation, we argue, therefore, that precisely because 
TAs generate their power through creating knowledge and, thereby, possibilities 
for action, one needs to shift the focus to the individual agent in the diffusion 
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process, as the place where previous knowledge (structures) and its creative 
adaptation (agency) meet. This in no way means that material structures, 
resources, and power play less of a role. But the only causal effects that they 
exert is through individual human beings, some of whom will obviously be more 
influential than others, depending on their structurally defined position. 
Adopting a focus on agents moreover underlines that policy diffusion is not 
realised in a straightforward and linear way but is always mediated by the 
agency and reflexivity of individuals. Even though highlighting the coercive 
nature of social protection policy diffusion through hegemonic ideas and an 
overall context in which TAs exert power in various ways, all individuals involved 
in the process possess agency. This holds true for those acting within TAs as 
well as those from domestic contexts. We thereby address also the criticism that 
diffusion theory often seems to suggest that receiving countries (usually in the 
global South) are passive applicants of policy models invented elsewhere 
(usually in the global North). Edwards (2020) points out that while our current 
international institutions, the global economy, and what might be called world 
culture all originate from racialised colonial relations, they are also products of 
interactive and relational dynamics with actors in the global South equally 
impacting on them (what she refers to as ‘subaltern agency’). While there is 
certainly a hierarchy that comes from the fact that rich countries often possess 
better-resourced research infrastructures and long-developed connections 
between research and policy (Dobbin et al. 2007), agents at the national and 
local levels are required to make diffusion effective. The more one zooms in on 
individual stories of diffusion, the less convincing it seems to maintain these 
dichotomous categories, as agents connect and often cut across those 
interwoven spheres. 
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3. The transnational history of 
coercive social policy learning in 
Africa 
In the following, we map out various processes through which coercive learning 
occurs within social protection in Africa, and explain how individuals have 
mattered. 
3.1 Coercive learning in shaping national social 
protection policies 
In 2010, only five countries in Africa had a National Social Protection Policy 
(NSPP) or Strategy (NSPS), but another 30 countries promulgated one between 
2010 and 2019. During this decade, a group of TAs that was active in promoting 
the adoption and institutionalisation of social protection in Africa instigated and 
often commissioned the process of producing these documents, which were 
typically drafted by teams led by expatriate consultants and sometimes included 
national consultants. Government officials were consulted but not necessarily 
centrally engaged in this policy formulation process. In 2012, for example, the 
World Bank published a report titled Togo: Towards a National Social Protection 
Policy and Strategy which ‘incorporates the Government’s comments’ (World 
Bank 2012: i). 
The 35 national policy documents display remarkable similarities in terms of their 
conceptual and programming content. Conceptually, they embody ideas about 
the appropriate framing of social policy that were produced by TAs. Most NSPPs 
follow the United Nations Children’s Fund’s (UNICEF) preferred ‘life-course’ 
approach, the World Bank’s ‘social risk management’ framework, the 
International Labour Organization’s (ILO) ‘social protection floor’, or 
‘transformative social protection’, from the UK’s Institute of Development Studies 
(IDS). Programmatically, most NSPPs are dominated by SCTs for targeted 
population groups identified as poor and/or vulnerable. 
The explanation for this convergence is that the ideas informing these 
documents derived not from domestic policy priorities or participatory 
consultation processes, but from an influential cohort of international agencies 
that shared a common agenda in terms of promoting the uptake of social 
protection in African countries, even if they disagreed on some details. 
Rather than learning from and emulating neighbouring countries or asking their 
own citizens about their preferences prior to choosing a particular policy 
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direction, African governments learned from agents of organisations that 
imported specific ideas and approaches from abroad. On some NSPPs, the 
logos of TAs that were involved in the process of developing the policy are 
prominently displayed on the cover, alongside the national coat of arms. 
3.2 Coercive learning through selective 
investment in evidence-building 
As noted above, once the TAs had identified targeted SCTs as their preferred 
social protection instrument in Africa, they advocated for the adoption of SCTs 
through tactics of ‘coercive learning’ and ‘policy merchandising’ (Adesina 2020). 
One tactic was to design and finance small-scale pilot projects, which TAs 
subjected to rigorous impact evaluations to generate evidence that was intended 
to persuade governments of the effectiveness of these programmes. Although 
TAs provided the initial financing, their objective was to hand over responsibility 
for running, scaling up, and financing these programmes to national 
governments. Sometimes different design modalities were tested (e.g. cash or 
food, or alternative targeting mechanisms), but the main purpose was policy 
advocacy for cash transfers. Summarising the evidence base as of 2011, the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID)3 concluded that cash transfers 
‘have proven potential to contribute directly or indirectly to a wider range of 
development outcomes’ (DFID 2011: i). 
Two initiatives illustrate the ways that TAs generated and used evidence 
explicitly for policy advocacy. The first is the Regional Hunger and Vulnerability 
Programme (RHVP), co-funded by DFID and the Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAID), which commissioned studies of 15 social 
protection programmes in six southern African countries under its Regional 
Evidence-Building Agenda (Ellis, Devereux and White 2009). The purpose was 
to disseminate good practice and influence social protection policy adoption 
across the region. RHVP’s theory of change was encapsulated as: ‘Evidence-
building + Capacity-building = Positive policy change’. 
The second is the Transfer Project, a joint initiative of two United Nations (UN) 
agencies, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and UNICEF, which 
commissioned impact evaluations of cash transfer programmes in eight 
African countries. As with RHVP, the intention was partly to contribute to 
building the evidence base, but also to feed into ‘evidence-based policy’ 
choices by the governments of these countries. In the Foreword to an edited 
book titled From Evidence to Action, the Director-General of FAO and the 
Executive Director of UNICEF state: ‘These pages also document the ways in 
which the Transfer Project has influenced the policy debate in each of the eight 
 
3  Now the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO). 
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countries… This innovative approach transcended impact evaluation and 
influenced wider social protection policies in each country’ (Davis et al. 2016: 
vi). 
Against this heavy investment in evaluating the impacts of often tiny cash 
transfer pilot projects, TAs invested very little into evaluating government-run 
programmes. This selectivity is one tactic of coercive learning. By drawing 
attention to projects they supported – through large monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) budgets that generated rigorous evaluation reports, policy briefs, national 
workshops and media attention – TAs ensured that cash transfer projects 
became synonymous with new and innovative thinking and practice on social 
protection in African countries. At the same time, less favoured government 
programmes were neglected and marginalised. The fact that donor-initiated pilot 
projects are more rigorously evaluated than government-run programmes is, in 
itself, confirmation of our assertion that evidence-building is both selective and 
coercive. 
It should be noted that the techniques applied by TAs to promote adoption of 
social protection in Africa are not new but can be traced back to colonial times. 
Yet the extent to which ‘evidence’ drives public policymaking has significantly 
grown over the past two decades, and has been attributed both to the end of 
ideological battles post-Cold War and to New Public Management ideals of 
efficiency and ‘value for money’ (Eyben 2013). 
3.3 Coercive learning through interventions in 
affordability and financing debates 
The initiation and expansion of cash transfer programmes in Africa was 
expedited by financial support provided by TAs, especially in countries where 
governments were reluctant to commit public resources of their own, either 
because of budget constraints, or because they were not yet convinced by the 
evidence, or because social protection was not a national priority at that time. 
TAs assumed, and tried to get governments to agree, that programmes initially 
funded by external actors would eventually be funded from domestic resources. 
However, in contexts of widespread poverty and limited fiscal space, 
governments were understandably hesitant about establishing permanent large-
scale welfare programmes, and there remains a large ‘ “affordability gap” 
between what is advocated for African countries and what these countries’ 
governments are willing to spend’ (Seekings 2017: ii). Many governments 
preferred to invest public resources in ‘productive’ sectors, such as agriculture 
through fertiliser and seed subsidies. But TAs are ideologically opposed to 
subsidies, so they tied their official development assistance (ODA) to cash 
transfer projects instead. This financial leverage gave TAs substantial power to 
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shape social policies throughout Africa, especially in heavily aid-dependent 
countries. 
One coercive learning tactic that TAs deployed was to try to refute perceptions 
by governments that social protection at scale is unaffordable in low-income 
countries. Several TAs – DFID, FAO, ILO, World Bank, and others – 
commissioned research and microsimulations to demonstrate that cash transfers 
should in effect be classified as public economic investments rather than social 
welfare spending, since they can generate income multipliers and contribute to 
economic growth (Alderman and Yemtsov 2012; Barrientos 2010; Taylor 2012). 
The ILO’s role in this area has been especially forceful. In the early 2000s, ILO 
produced a series of publications that addressed the rhetorical question: ‘Can 
low-income countries afford basic social protection?’ (Pal et al. 2005; Behrendt 
and Hagemejer 2009), sometimes with the added advocacy question in the sub-
title: ‘Can they afford not to have it?’ (ILO 2008). ILO’s advocacy strategy 
included modelling to show that a package of ‘basic benefits’ would cost 
countries only a few percentage points of GDP and could be paid for out of a 
combination of reallocation of government spending plus transitional financing 
from donors (Pal et al. 2005). More recently, ILO’s advocacy for expanded social 
protection shifted to advising governments on how they can create more fiscal 
space to ‘expand social investments’ (Ortiz, Cummins and Karunanethy 2015). 
3.4 Coercive learning through professional 
trainings 
The most direct pathway for coercive learning is by building the technical and 
administrative capacity of government officials to design and deliver social 
protection programmes, and to institutionalise national social protection systems. 
Since the early 2000s, bilateral and multilateral TAs have produced dozens of 
briefing papers and manuals on various aspects of social protection design and 
implementation. For example, DFID published a series called Social Protection 
Briefing Notes. Number 3 was titled Using Social Transfers to Improve Human 
Development, and included a section headed ‘How to decide which type of social 
transfers to use’ (DFID 2006). The World Bank produced a series of Social 
Safety Nets Primer Notes, followed by a 600-page tome called For Protection 
and Promotion: The Design and Implementation of Effective Safety Nets, with 
sections that included ‘Enrolling the client’, ‘Benefit levels and delivery 
mechanisms’, and ‘Using monitoring and evaluation to improve programmes’ 
(World Bank 2008). The European Commission published a Tools and Methods 
Reference Document called Social Transfers in the Fight Against Hunger which 
included sections headed ‘Justifying social transfers’, ‘Designing social 
transfers’, ‘Managing social transfers’, and ‘Financing social transfers’ (European 
Commission 2010). 
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In 2009, the ILO and WHO co-drafted a Manual and Strategic Framework for 
Joint UN Country Operations. The Foreword explained that: ‘This manual 
provides guidance for a Social Protection Floor [SPF] Approach at country level, 
led by governments with support from the UN system and other collaborating 
agencies’ (ILO and WHO 2009: vii). Table 2 sets out a ‘Tentative sequence of 
activities for implementing an SPF approach at country level’ and Section 3.4 
focuses on ‘Integration of the SPF into national, regional and global planning 
processes’ (ibid.: 11, 12). 
Some of these agencies translated their manuals into training workshops that 
they delivered not only to their own staff but to thousands of government and 
agency officials. The World Bank Institute has offered an annual two-week 
training course in Washington DC since the early 2000s, initially called The 
Design and Implementation of Effective Safety Nets and now called the Social 
Safety Nets and Delivery Core Course, with distance learning options in English, 
French, Russian, and Spanish. The ILO has an International Training Centre in 
Turin, where it offers a two-week training course each year on social protection 
systems. ILO also offers online training on Building and Managing Social 
Protection Floors in Africa, hosted by the ‘Virtual Campus’ of 
socialprotection.org. 
Although these documents and activities might be interpreted as contributing to a 
neutral process of discursive ideation, we suggest viewing them rather as 
instruments in the TA toolkit for ‘policy merchandising’ (Adesina 2020). The 
coercive learning objective of the ILO’s online course is explicit in the explanation 
of ‘What you will learn’: ‘By the end of this course, you should be able to 
understand why and how a Social Protection Floor is beneficial to your specific 
country context and how it can assist social and economic development’ 
(TRANSFORM 2020). Useful tools like this can become coercive instruments if 
they limit choice, and if they exert ‘hidden and invisible power to determine what 
knowledge counts’ (Eyben 2013: 3). 
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4. Zooming in on individuals in social 
protection diffusion in Zambia 
In this section we discuss the social protection policy process in Zambia through 
a study of three individual agents, selected based on variance in their 
positionalities. This is followed by reflections by each author on our own roles as 
‘agents’ in the ongoing social protection policy diffusion process in Zambia. In 
combination, both sub-sections allow us to draw conclusions about how structure 
and agency interact in diffusion practice. But first, we briefly recapitulate our 
argument about why individual agents matter in policy diffusion processes. 
4.1 Why agents matter 
It is commonly argued that the specific form of social protection that has 
permeated Africa in the last 20 years has been the product of TAs with particular 
ideological and ideational perspectives, which they ‘export’ in the form of policy 
ideas that they support – and by corollary, other policy ideas that they reject and 
do not support – in other words, that the idea of social protection is developed 
and propagated by ‘agencies’. We take a slightly different view. 
We argue that ideas of social protection were exported to Africa both by 
institutions (agencies) and by individuals (agents), and that agents and agencies 
are not indistinguishable, even if individual agents are broadly ideologically 
aligned with the institutions that employ or contract them. Although agency staff, 
such as social policy advisors and country desk officers, have their own ideas 
and preferences about the policies they promote, they often recruit intellectual 
and technical expertise from outside the agency, as short-term consultants. 
These agents fill the gap between broad policy orientation and specific policy 
advice or project design with their own creative ideas and inherent biases, to 
ensure that they become effective. 
This distinction between agencies and their agents matters because it nuances 
the popular view of donors as monolithic, with predefined ideas and rigid 
preferences that they roll out in a uniform way, across all countries in which they 
operate and exert policy influence. 
4.2 Three agents at the intersection between the 
transnational and domestic 
In the social protection community, the Zambian SCT is well-known. While the 
case lends itself to showing where individual agents have been influential in the 
ascent of the programme and the country’s wider National Social Protection 
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Policy, it likewise serves to illustrate the variety of roles that agents can play in 
diffusion. Three agents, who embody in different ways the transnational 
character of the policymaking process, are singled out in this section – not 
because they were necessarily the most important, but because they stand for 
different positionalities on the transnational–domestic spectrum and because 
they illuminate different ways in which individuals matter for diffusion. The focus 
is not on domestic policymakers or bureaucrats, who of course play the key roles 
in accounting for Zambia’s social protection policies and their implementation 
(Siachiwena 2016; Kapingidza 2019; Wolkenhauer 2020). Instead, since we are 
interested in cross-border diffusion, the focus is on individuals who intermediate 
between the national and international spheres. 
For decades, access to social protection in Zambia was restricted to a small 
minority of public and private sector workers, who benefited from employment-
linked social insurance schemes, especially old age pensions and insurance 
against work injuries and invalidities. This limited coverage was a legacy of 
Zambia’s colonial history, its copper dependence and its undiversified economy, 
that generated relatively few formal employment opportunities with associated 
benefits (Wolkenhauer 2021). However, in the early 2000s, in line with the global 
turn towards social protection, several non-contributory social assistance 
schemes were initiated, most visibly the SCT. The idea of the SCT entered 
Zambia in 2003 when the German development agency GTZ (now GIZ) hired 
Bernd Schubert as a consultant, to undertake a poverty profile of Kalomo district 
to inform GTZ’s social sector work. 
Schubert, a German national, is widely acknowledged as one of the original 
instigators of SCTs in Africa. He had worked with GTZ on the delivery of cash 
transfers in Mozambique before coming to Kalomo.4 He identified a category of 
so-called ‘incapacitated households’ where – due mainly to HIV and AIDS – 
there was nobody of the working age generation, leaving the household unable 
to meet its basic needs (ibid.). A meeting was subsequently conducted in the 
Ministry of Community Development where Schubert presented his results and 
introduced the idea of supporting these ‘ultra-poor’ households – which he 
defined as households that cannot meet even 80 per cent of their consumption 
needs despite spending 80 per cent or more of their income on food – with 
regular cash transfers. This proposal was met with some scepticism, so it was 
agreed to undertake a trial of such an intervention, funded by GTZ, to test its 
effectiveness (Schubert 2005; Kabandula and Seekings 2016). The Pilot SCT 
Scheme carried out in Kalomo district almost immediately showed positive 
results in terms of poverty reduction and food security (Schubert 2005). 
Although it would take several more years, more rigorous impact evaluations, 
and a new government to significantly expand the programme, the findings from 
 
4  Interview, Bernd Schubert (via Skype), 8 October 2018. 
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Kalomo became an important political tool for promoting social protection in other 
countries in the region. In 2006, HelpAge International (an international non-
governmental organisation) and the African Union organised a conference in 
Livingstone, Zambia, funded by DFID, to promote the model. It was attended by 
social ministries from 13 African countries, as well as representatives from Brazil, 
various UN agencies, and non-governmental organisations (Hagen 2009). The 
conference included a tour to Kalomo and resulted in the African Union’s 
‘Livingstone Call for Action’, which urged governments to adopt programmes 
similar to the Zambian SCT. Schubert subsequently went on to promote the 
‘Kalomo model’ in other countries, including Malawi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Zimbabwe, and South Sudan (Schubert 2020). When interviewing him more than 
ten years later, he was about to set off to Eswatini for another such assignment. 
An intriguing fact is that the ‘ultra-poor’ approach to targeting social assistance is 
found only in southern African countries where SCT projects were instigated and 
designed with inputs from Schubert. In other words, this idea came from an 
individual agent, it was not devised by the sponsoring agency, nor was it chosen 
by the government of each country. Even more pertinent, the agency that 
employed Schubert to initiate the SCT pilot project in the Kalomo district of 
Zambia was not in favour of SCTs. Rather than a Northern TA, in this case GTZ, 
‘merchandising’ the idea of SCTs to Zambia, the consultant hired by GTZ had to 
first convince the agency of his idea, then set up a project to try to convince the 
Government of Zambia. In the early 2000s, GTZ was well-known for promoting 
community-based health insurance schemes as their preferred anti-poverty 
instrument. Thanks to Schubert, GTZ became an early funder and one of the first 
promoters of cash transfers in Africa. 
Schubert can clearly be identified as a ‘policy pollinator’ (Devereux 2020) – an 
agent who flies from one country to the next with a standard policy prescription in 
his briefcase. By himself though, he did not diffuse the SCT into national policy; 
that would take several more years and other actors. In the mid-2000s, Zambia’s 
Ministry of Community Development began to draft a National Social Protection 
Strategy (Quarles van Ufford et al. 2016), which would culminate in the adoption 
of the National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) in 2014, and in which the SCT 
eventually became one of the flagship programmes. Two transnational agents 
who played key roles during that period are Charlotte Harland Scott, a 
development professional from the UK, later active in the Zambian Ministry of 
Community Development and UNICEF, and Denis Wood, a Zambian consultant 
and a key figure in donor-funded research and advocacy. 
Harland Scott came to Zambia in 1989 after studying development studies in the 
UK, where she was born, to work for an international humanitarian organisation 
in Mpika in Northern Zambia (Zimba 2014). Here she met and married (in 1994) 
Guy Scott, whose parents had moved to Zambia during the colonial era, and 
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who at the time was campaigning for a parliamentary seat in Mpika together with 
later-president Michael Sata. Harland Scott knew Sata because she stayed in his 
father’s home village. In 1995, she was hired by the Ministry of Community 
Development as a consultant assigned with the task of redesigning the 
government’s Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) (Siachiwena 2016). In 
this role, she tried unsuccessfully to lobby different donors for increased funding 
to PWAS (Harland 2011). 
Several years later, in 2003, Zambia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
resulted in the establishment of a sectoral advisory group (SAG) on social 
protection, to bring together different government departments, donors, and civil 
society (Kabandula and Seekings 2016). The SAG’s main function was to draft a 
strategy on social protection, which became part of the fifth National 
Development Plan. The advisory group selected Harland Scott as a consultant, 
paid by DFID, to draft the Ministry of Community Development’s strategy (ibid.). 
In 2007, she became the Chief of Social Policy for UNICEF Zambia, while 
continuing to work closely with the Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
government of the time (Siachiwena 2016). With UNICEF being one of the main 
international agencies promoting social protection in Zambia, this post has been 
a key point of influence throughout. Harland Scott remained in this position until 
2011, when Guy Scott became vice-president under Michael Sata and her UN 
position was incompatible with being married to a politician (Zimba 2014). When 
Guy Scott served as interim president from 2014 until 2015 upon Sata’s death, 
she served as the first lady of Zambia, and in 2016 ran as the MP for the Lusaka 
Central seat in the national assembly on a United Party for National 
Development (UPND) ticket (Rainbow News Zambia 2020). 
Harland Scott has been an influential agent in the SCT’s ascent and social 
protection more widely. Her biography and posts blur the lines between 
international and national, having had both an influential position in one of the 
main international agencies as well as direct access and political affiliation to the 
Sata government, which was responsible for the decisive expansion of the SCT 
budget in 2013 (Pruce and Hickey 2017). While being able to tap into powerful 
structural positions offered by her professional background and the established 
power of UNICEF, Harland Scott’s agency is one crucial component of the 
‘success story’ of the SCT. 
The third agent that we have singled out to exemplify the diffusion process of 
social protection in Zambia is Denis Wood, who has facilitated the 
communication between the transnational and national spheres. Wood, originally 
an agricultural specialist, was involved in a key piece of research early in the 
history of the SCT, when DFID funded an enquiry into the political feasibility of 
social protection in Zambia (Barrientos et al. 2005). Besides being involved with 
the donor research effort, Wood was also well connected to domestic decision 
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makers. He explained that those who want to influence policymaking, including 
donors and himself, need to target the ministerial technocrats as well as the 
inner circle of the president and his loyalists.5 As he put it:  
then, we’ve got the opportunists, these are the likes of you 
[Wolkenhauer as interviewer] and me, the World Bank, the CPs, the 
cooperating partners and so on, who would like to influence policy. 
Now, normally the big problem with regard to state involvement, 
state engagement, is, how do we influence the centre point here, 
and get the decision to be made at this particular level.6  
One of the channels for influencing the inner circle was a rather informal one. 
Wood and Michael Sata went to the same Catholic church, and in the church 
yard he talked to Sata about the SCT, who later decided to raise support for it in 
the Ministries of Community Development, Finance and Labour.7 
Wood subsequently kept his role as a facilitator of the ongoing diffusion process 
by which the NSPP was further refined and expanded. He has been involved in 
composing reports of the yearly reviews of the Zambian social protection system, 
that consist of several trips by Ministry officers and TAs through the country, 
followed by intensive workshops in Lusaka. These tours and workshops form an 
important part of the collective learning process between government 
departments and the various TAs. Finally, Wood is also a generous interview 
partner for academics trying to reconstruct the history of the SCT and thereby 
diffuses his knowledge back into the transnational academic discourse. 
In sum, all three agents exemplify how coercive learning structures need to be 
‘enacted’ (policy merchandising through TAs), that this is enabled by existing 
power structures (linked to resources and legitimacy of involved TAs), and that 
these become influential through an individual’s agency that connects the 
international and national levels. 
Having demonstrated that policy learning becomes politically meaningful by 
being embedded in power relations (hence our term ‘coercive learning’), it would 
be helpful to shed further light on these research activities in particular: how 
much agency do they leave to agents, how much are they shaped by existing 
structures? For a tentative answer to these questions, we draw on our own 
experience as policy researchers in the Zambian social protection space. 
 
5  Interview, Denis Wood, Lusaka, 1 February 2018. 
6  Ibid. 
7  Ibid. 
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4.3 Two experiences from a self-reflexive 
perspective 
Both authors of this paper have been involved in social protection policy diffusion 
in Zambia at different stages, in 2008–09 (Devereux) and in 2017–18 
(Wolkenhauer). While we do not consider ourselves particularly significant for the 
trajectory of social policy in Zambia, our experiences are illustrative of how 
agencies and their agents interact to co-construct social policy in the global 
South by way of coercive learning. This self-reflexivity can therefore further 
substantiate the arguments made in this paper. 
In 2008–09, Devereux was contracted by DFID Zambia, representing the 
Government of the Republic of Zambia and Cooperating Partners in Social 
Protection, to provide support to the Technical Working Group (TWG) on ‘Social 
Assistance for Incapacitated Households’ (Schubert’s term for households with 
low productive capacity, his preferred target group for SCTs). Background 
documents provided by DFID included ‘a draft “Options paper” prepared by in-
country active donors in social protection (DFID, UNICEF, Irish Aid primarily)’ 
(SP-CP Technical Group 2008: 2). ILO endorsed this paper, adding in the 
margin: ‘We also strongly agree that the priority is to develop a National Social 
Protection Programme for Zambia’ – though whose priority this was is not clear. 
The first written output of this consultancy was a review of Zambia’s five SCT 
pilot schemes, and the final written output was a Proposal for the Scaling Up of 
the Social Cash Transfers in Zambia. Both documents were co-authored by 
Devereux and Denis Wood, who was recruited and paid by DFID as the local 
consultant. The review was prepared for the TWG on Social Assistance, with 
both authors named on the cover (Devereux and Wood 2008). However, the 
scale-up proposal was officially authored by the Ministry of Community 
Development and Social Services (MCDSS 2009) for submission to the 
Cooperating Partners for their financial and technical assistance. This proposal 
from a Zambian government ministry went through at least six drafts, with 
detailed comments provided on each by the Social Protection Cooperating 
Partners, and occasional comments provided by MCDSS. 
Zambia in the early 2000s was a laboratory for testing alternative design 
modalities for SCTs, with funding and technical support provided by different TAs 
with their own mandates and ideologies. For example, conditionalities were 
applied in one district but not in others, higher benefits were paid in one district to 
test whether this produced bigger impacts, and the 10 per cent most 
incapacitated households were targeted in four districts but all persons over 60 
(i.e. a universal social pension) were targeted in the fifth. Cooperating Partners 
objected (in written feedback to the authors) to the draft MCDSS proposal 
describing these as two distinct programmes: ‘ONE scheme with TWO targeting 
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mechanisms – please emphasise the cohesion and rationale, rather than 
repeatedly suggesting that there is some huge difference’. By 2008, the 
Cooperating Partners were campaigning for their pilot schemes to scale up and 
merge into a national social protection programme – which is why they hired 
consultants to write this proposal for MCDSS – so the proposal was required to 
present the five pilots as coherent building blocks towards this vision, rather than 
as fragmented and fundamentally incompatible projects. 
Ten years later, the SCT had become institutionalised and widely accepted but 
the internationalised learning process continued. Though for the most part 
government-driven and -funded, the Government of Zambia continued to receive 
technical and financial assistance for the SCT through the UN Joint Programme 
on Social Protection (UNJP-SP), at the time consisting of UNICEF, ILO, FAO, 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), and World Food Programme 
(WFP) (UNICEF 2019). While in its early years, research revolved around impact 
evaluations of the SCT, the focus later moved to fine-tuning of the targeting and 
implementation of the transfer, as well as improving the alignment between 
different programmes within the NSPP. This was one rationale behind FAO’s 
contracting of Wolkenhauer in 2017 to support the Ministry of Community 
Development’s assessment of the Food Security Pack (FSP). 
The FSP is meant to enable participating households to be self-sustaining 
through improved productivity and food security for which it supplies them with 
farming inputs (fertiliser, seed, and sometimes livestock). For four years, funded 
by the Norwegian aid agency, the FSP had been complemented with an 
electronic voucher and a cash supplement (Hichaambwa, Tembo and Tembo 
2014), so there was an interest to learn how both versions worked. The 
assessment was moreover supposed to shed light on possible linkages between 
the FSP, the SCT and the much larger farming input support programme (FISP). 
In this case, the main diffusion happened upwards. Practices were assessed at 
the local level to inform policy reform at the national level, and to feed into FAO’s 
transnational stock of expertise. 
For this assessment, Wolkenhauer conducted interviews and focus group 
discussions with state officers, civil society, and recipients, to learn about their 
roles, experiences, and daily challenges. She wrote a report, whose main 
findings were presented to leading bureaucrats in the Ministry of Community 
Development in early 2018, via Skype, as Wolkenhauer had travelled back home 
by then. Based on her assessment, another consultant, an experienced Zambian 
academic, was then tasked with the organisation of a new pilot to put the derived 
best practices to test. 
One striking observation is that Wolkenhauer, whose positionality as an outsider 
should have counted against her, was able to tap into existing structures of 
epistemic authority, derived from her affiliation with the FAO as an established 
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agency, all the while reproducing (postcolonial) legacies of whose knowledge is 
considered credible. Provided with sufficient resources, she was able to bridge 
distances between the capital and remote areas and speak to lower-level 
bureaucrats who held the relevant knowledge of the programmes. In these ways, 
existing structures of power and resources were enabling factors. 
This policy learning exercise consisted of the collection of existing knowledge 
from a variety of actors and places, which had not become powerful by itself but 
needed to be diffused to the policymaking level through condensation and 
formalisation. Needless to say, all that was supposed to be ‘learnt’ about the 
programmes was known to all those dispersed individuals involved in their daily 
implementation, most notably the district and sub-district officers. Besides their 
stored memories, day-to-day reports of programmes existed in local offices but 
had remained underutilised. Simply by being given sufficient time, resources, 
and transport to visit many offices and spend several days talking to officers, the 
consultancy provided an opportunity for tapping into all those treasures of 
experience and knowledge. In the ‘field’, the research task provided by the FAO 
and Ministry needed to be interpreted, such as by choosing who to speak with 
and what questions to ask. These choices were inevitably informed by the 
previous knowledge, positionalities, and unconscious instincts of the researcher, 
and ultimately impacted on the findings derived for the assessment. Far from 
being neutral, even if transparent and robust, the research outputs were 
contingent on these factors, too. 
As another instance of mediating between different realms, this assessment 
involved a lot of translation between different knowledges. Apart from having to 
be detected and synthesised, the dispersed expertise needed to be brought into 
a format and framework that corresponded with conventions at the transnational 
and national levels. In this case, the FAO had clear ideas as to the structure of 
the final assessment report and it took several rounds of revisions for it to adhere 
to a format that made sense to professionals in Rome. One might say, this sort 
of bottom-up diffusion was not only about the substantive findings on social 
protection but also about facilitating the communication between different 
spheres that run according to different social logics – district offices in rural 
places and transnational knowledge repositories. Standardised procedures and 
formats, including for instance recognised methodologies or predefined sub-
headings are needed for policy ideas to travel across geographical contexts. A 
degree of ‘creativity’ is required in fitting what was learned in the field into such 
grids, while the necessary epistemic authority is provided by the researcher’s 
structural position. Exclusion mechanisms meanwhile ensure a reproduction of 
knowledge hierarchies: contextual understanding alone does not provide access 
to policymaking. Postcolonial power relations thus correlate with a hierarchy of 
knowledge and are ultimately reproduced through these acts of agency. 
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Taken together, both self-reflexions show that individual agents like us are key in 
the diffusion of policies across localities. While we have considerable leverage 
over research procedures and findings, which in turn exert powerful performative 
effects, we operate within the larger structures of coercive learning. These 
include the power we are given through our positions in the larger postcolonial 
structure and our affiliations with professional fields and TAs’ resource 
endowments. They also include having to adhere to predefined agendas as well 
as formalities and power dynamics that render some types of knowledge more 
intelligible than others. Hence these reflections have shown that any diffusion 
process necessarily rests on agents’ agency and involves countless moments of 
latent transformation. But they have also demonstrated that the room for change 
is curtailed by the overall context of coercive learning. 
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The adoption by many African governments of social protection policies, and 
specifically SCTs, as a coherent set of ideas developed by agencies located in 
the global North, must be seen as one of the most remarkably successful 
cases of transnational policy diffusion in recent times. Between 2010 and 2016, 
for instance, the number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa with at least one 
social assistance programme doubled to 40 out of 48 countries, largely driven 
by ‘the efforts of transnational actors to promote particular forms of social 
assistance through a combination of ideational influence and financial leverage’ 
(Hickey et al. 2020: 11). 
The literature identifies four diffusion pathways, two of which – competition and 
emulation – are government-led while the other two – coercion and learning – 
speak directly to the activities of TAs. Our theoretical contribution to this literature 
is to suggest that learning in this context cannot be separated from coercion, as 
it entails the construction of policy possibilities and a dominant understanding of 
problems and solutions. Despite its objective connotation, ‘evidence-based 
policymaking’ is not apolitical. At the same time, discursive structures are not 
effective in and of themselves but always need to be interpreted and enacted by 
individuals. Whether policy messages are delivered as technical advice, training 
activities, or evidence generated from project evaluations, agencies and their 
agents exert influence over policy choices by the knowledge they select or omit, 
and how they present this knowledge to policymakers and politicians. This 
process, which we term ‘coercive learning’, calls for a closer look at human 
agents, particularly those who straddle and connect the transnational and 
domestic spheres. 
At the empirical level, this paper explored the roles played by three influential 
individual agents who worked for transnational agencies to expedite the uptake 
of social protection in Zambia. These agents ‘diffused’ policy ideas in various 
ways and their individual biographies transcend national boundaries, affiliations, 
and positionalities. While, initially at least, this was a story of policy diffusion 
failure, as the TAs experimented with different cash transfer design modalities in 
five districts, leaving the government confused about which version of social 
protection it should adopt and scale up, the social protection agenda ultimately 
took hold. This was mainly due to domestic political developments, specifically a 
change in government that increased domestic support and enabled effective 
policy coalitions. 
Nonetheless, throughout the Zambian social protection policy diffusion story, the 
role of research and evidence has played a large part. We included a reflection 
on our own experiences with such learning and advisory activities to show that 
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the knowledge that accrues and ultimately influences policymaking is far from 
neutral but always shaped by how we enact given structures as well as interpret 
them creatively. Individual agents such as consultants exert considerable 
influence through their coercive learning activities, but the type of knowledge that 
is understood by transnational agencies and their agents generates its own 
exclusion mechanisms. 
In sum, we propose the adoption of a critical and self-reflexive perspective onto 
policy diffusion as coercive learning, and to factor in the individual human agents 
involved in the process – for they are the actors who transport and translate 
ideas back and forth between different institutional structures and social worlds. 
This perspective not only transcends common dichotomous conceptions of 
senders and receivers in diffusion processes but manages to factor in structure 
and agency, and to account for the reproduction of dominant ideas as well as the 
perpetual potential for change. 
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